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Hostile Takeovers and Intangible Resources:
An Empirical Investigation
This study investigates the causes of hostile takeover activity. A sample of 185 firms which
experienced hostile takeover bids between 1981 and 1988 is contrasted with a sample of control
firms which did not receive hostile bids. Special attention is given to concerns that hostile
takeovers distrupt fmns with rent-generating intangible resources. Hostile target fmns have lower
profitability than other fmns in their core industry, are more likely have lower market to book
ratios and high span, and are less likely to have high R&D/sales accompanied by a high market
to book ratio. This shows that hostile takeover targets tend to be poor diversifiers and are
unlikely to be high value innovators. These findings collectively suggest that the market for
corporate control targets fmns which have not succeeded in developing rent-generating intangible
resources. No evidence is found which supports undervaluation and stakeholder expropriation
theories of gains from hos~le takeovers.

Perhaps the most controversial type of restructuring in the 1980s was the hostile takeover. In
a 1991 Clark Martire & Bartolemeo survey of 173 Fortune 500 CEOs, 69 percent of respondents
felt that hostile takeovers have hurt the economy while only 22 percent felt that they had helped
(Fortune 1991: 73). These CEOs criticized hostile takeover attempts for sapping executive time,

cutting research and capital spending and increasing debt. Those who praised hostile deals
pointed to their ability to discipline complacent firms, cut payroll and mothball projects not
involved in core objectives. The ire directed against hostile takeovers, in part, reflects the large
number of uninvited tender offers launched in the 1980s. More than 300 firms were subject to
hostile takeover attempts in the 1980-1990 period (see Table 1).
The CEO's minority view that hostile takeovers are a means of disciplining inefficient
management is well-established in the literature. Manne's (1965) argument that a market for
corporate control works to replace poor management teams has been extensively developed in
the literature. Michael Jensen (1986), a prominent advocate of the benefits of an active market
for corporate control, argues that managers squander cash flow on poor investments in many
public companies. Jensen reasons that hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts force the payout
of excess cash flow.
Critics of hostile takeover activity question the proposition that corporate raiders can offer
superior management services to beleaguered companies. For example, Catl Icahn's tenure at
TWA following his successful hostile bid has seen the company file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Others counter that many firms which are taken over in hostile transactions are broken apart in
a value-increasing manner. Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) document the high rate of asset
sales following hostile takeovers. Yet, even if hostile takeovers cause companies to be broken
apart they may still fail to cause assets to be better managed. Companies which have achieved
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synergies across strategic business units may be damaged by "bust ups." The potential damage
wrought by hostile deals on strategic business combinations was recognized by the Delaware
Chancery Court in its 1989 Time decision. The Court argued that Paramount's unsolicited cash
tender offer for Time could be rejected because of a pre-existing strategic plan designed to
enhance long-term shareholder value. Important elements of such strategic plans may involve
exploitation of finn-specific human resources, product innovations, marketing knowledge and
synergies from co-management of related business units.
The main purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the hypothesis that firms
which have succeeded in creating value through diversification and innovation programs are
frequent targets of hostile takeovers. The intent is to shed light on arguments that hostile
takeovers have damaged valuable intangible corporate resources. The paper then empirically
contrasts this hypothesis with the alternative hypothesis that hostile takeovers primarly serve to
remedy shareholder-manager agency problems and discipline managers who invest excess cash
flow unwisely. The analysis also explores two subsidiary hypotheses: (1) that hostile takeovers
target undervalued but strong companies and (2) that hostile takeovers harm stakeholders
including employees, union members and pensionholders.
Surprisingly, little previous attention has been given to the potential damage that hostile
deals may bring to firms which have created value through long-term strategies of diversification
and exploitation of valuable finn-specific knowledge and resources.

Hitt, Hoskisson and

Ireland's (1990) argument that acquisitions reduce management's commitment to innovation
suggests that hostile takeovers, especially when accompanied by high leverage, may cause
managers to scale back on innovation.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A hostile takeover involves an extreme change in the business environment. A new management
team assumes control of a firm and typically replaces many high and middle level employees.
Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) document layoffs following roughly half of hostile takeovers.
Asset divestitures were also widespread. Approximately two thirds of the firms in the Bhagat,
Shleifer and Vishny sample undertook major divestitures. Firms which survive a hostile offer
typically experience poor performance (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). Because of the high level
of layoffs following takeover by a corporate raider, Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)
characterize firms run by raiders as transitory business organizations. This important finding
motivates the principal hypotheses investigated in this paper. To the extent that the operating
environment of the firm is highly levered and short-term oriented it will typically cause major
changes in operating decisions.

Hostile Takeovers and the Exploitation of Intangible Resources
An important impact of the shift to a short-term, cash flow-oriented operating environment
brought by a hostile takeover may be to hinder the effectiveness of strategies oriented towards
creating and exploiting intangible corporate resources. The importance of intangible resources
in determining firm performance has been emphasized by Penrose (1959) and Wemerfelt (1984).
Pressure to generate high cash flow to satisfy the objectives of a raider and debt obligations is
likely to increase management's aversion towards undertaking growth-oriented investments.
Mansfield (1969) has documented the high failure rate of innovative investment projects. Many
of these investments involve development of firm-specific knowledge and skills and experiments
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in diversification (see Biggadike, 1979 and Lippman and Rumelt, 1983).

Consequently, a

manager of a firm which has been taken over through a hostile transaction will be unlikely to
undertake the costly and risky investments necessary to create and exploit intangible resources.
Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland (1990) agree that many acquisitions are likely to reduce
management's willingness to assume the risk involved in innovation.
A further adverse impact of a hostile takeover may be to cause effective incumbent
managers to leave for other positions which have the original operating environment of the target
finn (Fray, Down and Gaylin, 1985; Walsh, 1989). These managers are likely to possess
important knowledge of the firm's employees, technology and organizational capabilities that are
necessary to successfully exploit intangible resources. Employees which remain following a
hostile takeover typically have low morale and little desire to cooperate with a new management
team (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989).
The shift towards achievement of high, immediate financial performance also calls for an
alternative set of organizational controls (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988) centering on monitoring of
business unit performance. Financial and formal bureaucratic controls of an organization are
likely to hamper management's ability and commitment to innovate and exploit finn-specific
resources (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). The less formal behavioral controls more likely prior
to the arrival of a hostile bid enhance the pursuit of innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland,
1990). The above arguments concerning the difficulty of exploiting valuable intangible resources
in a transitory, financially oriented business organization suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Research-intensive organizations with valuable options for long-term
growth are unlikely targets of hostile takeovers.
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Hypothesis lb: Profitable businesses are unlikely targets of hostile takeovers.

The latter hypothesis follows from the important role of intangible resource development in
detennining profitability (Rumelt, 1984; Hansen and Wemerfelt, 1989; Teece, Pisano and Shoen,
1990). A rational corporate raider, thus, will find it relatively difficult to create value by a
hostile bid when a firm has a large stock of research and related intangible resources.
One organizational type that is particularly vulnerable to shifting from informal controls
to more strict financial controls is the synergistic, diversified firm. Interdependence across
businesses increases the difficulty of evaluating the value added by any particular division
business manager (Jones and Hill, 1988). Such organizations are naturally among the most likely
to develop and exploit intangible resources across business units (Bettis and Hall, 1982). This
leads to the following additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Diversified businesses with valuable intangible resources and capabilities
are poorly suited for hostile takeovers.

One of the most important repositories of a firm's knowledge capital is its employees.
Human resource intensive firms thus are among the most vulnerable to hostile takeovers given
employee freedom to leave the firm after a change of organizational environment Problems may
exist with employees that remain who lose their incentive to build and apply specific knowledge
in an unstable and transitory environment (Marks, 1982). This suggests a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Human-resource intensive organizations are poorly suited for the
transition to a financially-oriented, transitory business environment.

The preceding analysis has outlined the two principal hypotheses tested in this study. These
hypotheses differ but do not entirely exclude the most commonly given rationale for hostile
takeovers: the failure of management-shareholder contracting.
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Agency Theory and Hostile Takeovers
The rise of hostile takeover activity in the 1980s has been widely interpreted as the response of
the market for corporate control to problems in shareholder-management agency. The theory of
agency problems has a long history beginning with Berle and Means (1932) and Marris (1964).
Manne (1965) suggested that takeovers are a means of remedying inefficient management
practice. This argument has been developed and tested extensively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter, 1988; Butz 1991; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). When the top managers of a finn fail
to exploit opportunities for value-creation they expand the scope for an outside entrepreneur to
profitably assume control. The agency-theoretic perspective offers several distinct strands of
thought regarding the source of managerial inefficiencies.

Deadwood Managers

An important argument articulated by Manne (1965) is that takeovers replace incompetent
managers. Management teams may not be competent to achieve the highest value from a finn's
resources a variety of reasons including incapacity, overextension, lack of experience, change in
business environment Entrenched and incompetent managers offer the most compelling rationale
for the hostile takeover (T. Boone Pickens, 1986). Walsh and Ellwood (1991) examine the
argument that takeovers discipline managerial "deadwood" by showing that poor pre-acquisition
performance is followed by abnormal post-acquisition management turnover. Post acquisition
turnover most likely represents the pruning of deadwood managers. Perhaps the clearest evidence
of management incompetency is the past performance of the finn. This suggests:
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Hypothesis 4. Firms with below average profitability are more likely to be the target of
a hostile takeover.

Ex Ante Contracting Failure
Another strand of the literature explains management inefficiency as a contracting failure.
Management runs a firm poorly because it lacks the incentive to do better. Here managers are
not deadwood insofar as they could create value given a contract which aligns their interests with
those of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).

Contracting failure may occur because

management is not rewarded for performance (Holmstrom, 1979 and Jensen and Mmphy, 1989),
because management is unwilling to assume the risks involved in maximizing value (Hirshleifer
and Suh, 1991) or because the firm has a suboptimal debt-equity ratio (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Myers, 1977). A hostile takeover offers an extreme solution to contracting failure given
that large shareholder-led recontracting efforts should be able to correct sufficiently serious
problems (Butz, 1990). In many cases a hostile takeover may be attempted but fended off by
managers who obtain more incentive-oriented contracts or divest poorly performing divisions.
One of the most controversial types of contracting failure arises when managers make
arrangements which shield the firm from hostile takeovers. These arrangements may involve the
adoption of poison pills, golden parachutes or supermajority voting provisions (Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter, 1988). While such provisions may make hostile takeovers more costly, they can
actually invite hostile bids by signalling contracting failure.

This suggests the following

hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5a: Defensive contractual provisions (e.g. poison pills and supermajority
voting provisions) increase the likelihood of a hostile takeover by signalling contractual
failure.
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Hypothesis 5b: Defensive contractual provisions deter hostile takeovers by increasing the
cost of completing a hostile bid.
A classical symptom of contractual failure is excessive and inefficient diversification. Managers
who do not enjoy the same objectives as shareholders often wish to increase finn size through
diversification to reduce risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Growth in size itself may be a shelter
from hostile takeovers and ouster by the Board of Directors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). A
lengthy literature dating at least back to Mueller (1969) suggests that conglomerate mergers are
used to gain the higher pay given to managers of large firms. This literature is surveyed by Seth
(1990) and Weidenbaum and Vogt (1987). Recent contributions include Chatterjee (1986), Singh
and Montgomery (1987), Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989),
Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Comment and Jarrell (1992). It is plausible that many
hostile takeovers are motivated by the gains from dismantling poorly diversified firms. This
leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Firms with histories of poor diversification are likely targets of hostile
takeovers.

Ex Post Contracting Failure
An alternative view sees shareholder-management contracts as optimal when signed. After the
fact, however, they may be suboptimal and difficult to change. In particular, a finn's investments
may yield greater cash flow than expected. In these circumstances, managers have an incentive
to reinvest cash flow in low return projects (Stulz, 1989). One remedy for this type of ex post
contractual failure is a hostile takeover.

Indeed, Jensen (1986, 1988) has argued that an

important putpose of the market for hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts is to force firms
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with high cash flow that lack good investment opportunities to pay cash flow to outside investors.
The free cash flow argument for leveraged buyouts has been empirically studied by Lehn
and Poulsen (1989), Singh (1990), Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen (1992) and Opler and
Titman (1992). Similarly, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that targets of hostile takeovers often
have poor previous acquisitions records, suggesting that they used their -resources unwisely.
However, they do not link levels of cash flow to vulnerability to hostile takeover. An important
hypothesis suggested by the free cash flow theory which differs from Hypotheses 1a and 4 is the
following:

Hypothesis 7: Firms with above average cash flow are likely targets of hostile takeovers.

Stakeholder Expropriation
Hostile takeovers may be motivated by gains obtained from breaking implicit contracts with
employees and other stakeholders in the firm. Shleifer and Summers (1988), for example, find
that substantial wage reductions followed the takeover of TWA by Carl Icahn and proceed to
argue that gains in hostile takeovers may often come from breaching previous implicit agreements
with employees and their labor unions.

Rosett (1989) finds that wage reductions of union

employees cannot explain all of the premia paid in acquisitions. Because labor unions are often
viewed as a mechanism through which employees gain rents from firms and are sometimes
targeted in hostile deals (e.g. Dan River) the following hypothesis is tested:

Hypothesis 8: Firms with significant employee unionization are likely targets of hostile
takeovers.
Of course, employees may be damaged by hostile takeovers even without cuts in union wages.
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Pontiff, Shleifer and Weisbach (1990) show that reversions of excess pension assets are more
common after hostile than after friendly takeovers. This suggests that one motive for hostile
takeovers is to reduce employee compensation in the form of promised pension payments. Firms
with employees vulnerable to this reduction are those with relatively high pension expense.
Hypothesis 9: Firms with high pension expense per employee are likely targets of hostile
takeovers.

Earlier, I suggested that employee-intensive organizations make poor hostile targets because of
problems that may occur post-takeover with human resources. The employee expropriation
theory would suggest the opposite. Labor-intensive firms offer relatively more scope for wage
reductions and pension reversions.

Misvaluation

One interpretation of the high rate of asset divestitures following hostile takeovers is that raiders
are taking advantage of undervaluation of firms in the capital market. T. Boone Pickens gained
fame, for example, by pointing out that it was cheaper to buy oil on Wall Street than to drill for
it. LeBaron and Speidell (1987) have characterized the 1980s as the age of corporate valuation
when raiders exploited differences in firm's underlying asset values and their stock prices. One
problem with the undervaluation explanation of takeover activity is that it is not consistent with
the widely established market efficiency hypothesis (Jensen, 1988).

Firms should not be

undervalued in an equilibrium because they would otherwise offer profits without commensurate
risks to ordinary investors. Brennan (1990), however, shows that misvaluation may persist in an
equilibrium because asymmetric information problems hinder efforts of investors to identify and
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exploit it. He argues, therefore, that the large premia paid in some takeovers such as that of
RJR/Nabisco may indeed reflect misvaluation. Brennan's argument points to a means of testing
the undervaluation explanation of hostile takeovers. To the extent that firms are more difficult
to value they are more likely to be misvalued in an equilibrium. This leads to the following
hypothesis:

Hypothesis 10: Firms which are more difficult for outsiders to value are more likely to
be the target of hostile takeovers.
One way to observe outsider valuation of firms is through analyst estimates of future earnings.

Previous Literature
There have been relatively few studies which have examined the characteristics of hostile
takeover targets. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) show that hostile targets have poorer acquisition
records and similar ownership structure as friendly targets. Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)
show that hostile targets are likely to have growth rates and be in lower q industries than do
friendly targets. They interpret this evidence as showing that hostile target firms are more likely
to be mature firms in declining industries. Other factors examined in their study had little power
to distinguish hostile and friendly targets. Similarly, Browne and Rosengren (1987) found no
factors which statistically distinguished hostile takeover targets from other firms besides their
size. These authors concluded that hostile target firms were not appreciably different from other
targets of merger and acquisition activity. Palepu (1986) predicts the incidence of takeovers of
all types from a general population. Palepu finds that takeover targets have lower growth and
leverage than other fmns but do not differ in their levels of profitability. This study differs from
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First, it examines an expanded set of hypotheses-

especially the possibility that hostile target firms have high levels of intangible resources.
Second, it compares a fairly large group of hostile targets to control fmns. This increases the
statistical power of the analysis and leads to results which are richer than found in most previous
analyses.

METHODS
This study investigates the theories and hypotheses established in the preceding section by
comparing the characteristics of firms that have been the target of a hostile takeover attempt to
those that have not. The relative importance of various explanations for hostile deals can be
indirectly assessed by comparing the characteristics of hostile targets to a control sample of nontarget fmns. This section identifies the sample used for this analysis and describes empirical
proxies for characteristics hypothesized to predict the incidence of hostile takeovers.

Sample
The sample of fmns analyzed in this study is drawn from a listing of firms covered by the Value
Line Investment Survey in 1980. Mark Mitchell and Ken Lehn examined the incidence of control

related activity for all of these fmns from 1980 to 1988 and kindly provided the data for use in
this study. The sample is more fully described in Mitchell and Lehn (1990). The fmns in Value
Line have an aggregate market value of more than 95 percent of the total market value of

publicly traded firms in the United States.
Financial characteristics of fmns in the sample were obtained from the COMPUSTAT II
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PST, Research and Full Coverage files. Information about finn's diversification was constructed
using establishment level data on employment taken from the 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1987
versions of the TRINET Large Establishment Data Base. Unionization data was provided by Joe
Tracy. Data on the presence of defensive measures including poison pills and antitakeover
charter provisions was provided by Jonathan Karpoff and was compiled from various sources
including DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1987). Tim Devinney provided
a list of new product announcements from the Wall Street Journal.

This list was used to

construct a dummy variable which took the value one when a finn had announced three or more
new products and zero otherwise.

Panel Design
The characteristics of hostile takeover targets are examined using univariate tests and binary logit
regressions on a panel dataset consisting of all firms in the Value Line Survey as of 1980 which
were successfully matched with TRINET diversification data and COMPUSTAT financial data.
Because the TRINET data are biannual, a panel design was employed with four two-year periods
of data per surviving finn. These periods were 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1987. No takeover in the
sample was initiated before 1981 or after 1988. Firm characteristics at the beginning of 1981
are used to predict firms which became hostile takeover targets in the 1981 and 1982, while data
at the beginning of 1983 was used to predict takeovers in 1983 and 1984 and so on. Table 2
shows the number of hostile takeover targets in the sample in each biannual period in the panel
and the number of control firms. In total the sample contains data on 185 hostile takeover targets
and approximately 700 control firms.
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Measurement Procedures
The hypothesis that firms with above average profitability are likely hostile takeover targets is
tested using a dummy variable which identifies firms which had a ratio of income before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to sales below the industry median.

Finn

diversification can be measured in a variety of ways. Perhaps the simplest is span-a count the
number of separate SIC codes in which the firm has establishments. This measure is computed
at the four-digit SIC level using TRINET. Tobin's q, the ratio of the market value of a finn's
liabilities to the replacement value of its assets, has been widely used as a measure of the firm's
effectiveness in using its resources to generate value (Lindenberg and Ross, 1976). The argument
that poor diversifiers are more likely hostile takeover targets (Hypothesis 6) suggests that the
relation between span and the likelihood a hostile takeover is contingent on the level of q. This
possibility is operationalized by observing whether span predicts hostile bids better for firms
which have below the average q in their core industry. Tobin's q is operationally defined as the
market value of a firm's equity plus the book value of its debt over the book value of its assets.
This definition has been shown to be highly correlated with other definitions which more closely
take account of the replacement value of assets using inflation adjustment (Wiles, 1990). A
finn's ratio of research and development expense to sales is used as a generalized proxy for its
level of intangible assets.

R&D-intensive firms are likely to have developed finn-specific

resources (Singh and Chang, 1992).

The value of those resources for future growth and

profitability can be assessed by looking at the interaction of a dummy for below average q
multiplied by the firm's R&D/sales ratio. Finns with high q and high R&D intensity would be
the most likely to be using internal innovation as an important means of creating value and future
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earnings growth opportunities. Other important intangible resources are a firm's marketing
capital. Advertising-intensive firms are likely to have achieved greater brand name recognition
and product differentiation with consumers. Likewise, firms which have announced unique
products are likely to have achieved greater potential for establishing brand name capital. Firms
with high brand loyalty may be less vulnerable than firms with other types of intangible capital
insofar as brand names can be sold off in a transitory, cash flow-oriented organizational
environment (e.g. RJR Nabisco's divestiture of Del Monte). The level of a firm's unionization
is difficult to measure directly because data on the fraction of unionized employees is highly
imperfect and is often based on surveys. Thus, at the recommendation of Joe Tracy of Yale, a
labor economist who provided the data used here, I have created a dummy variable which takes
the value one when any of the firm's employees are covered under a collective bargaining
agreement

Barriers to takeover activity can be explicit in the form of poison pills and

antitakeover charter amendments or implicit (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). One important implicit
barrier is firm size insofar as financing arrangements needed to takeover large corporations are
more difficult to arrange, especially through bank and junk bond financings.

Firm size is

measured as the log of the book value of a firm's assets. While informational asymmetry affects
the likelihood of firm undervaluation, it is very difficult to measure. One measure which has
been used elsewhere (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989) is the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts
for a firm. Analysts are likely to arrive at divergent forecasts when firms are difficult to value
because they are diversified or have imperfectly observable assets.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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Characteristics of Hostile Takeover Targets
The results of univariate analyses of the characteristics of hostile takeover targets are reported
in Table 3. The table shows that 42.2% of hostile takeover targets have income below their
industry average while control firms had below average income only 33.8% of the time. This
difference is statistically significant at the the 5 percent level and is consistent with Hypothesis
1b and Hypothesis 4 which argue that hostile takeover targets have low profitability. The result
is not consistent with the free cash flow theory which suggests that hostile takeover targets would
have high profitability and poor growth prospects.
The table shows that hostile takeover targets operated in an average of 15.6 4-digit SIC
industries whereas the average span of control firms was 13.1 industries. This difference is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The greatest difference in span occured among
firms with below industry average Tobin's q (10.8 for hostile targets vs. 6.7 for control firms).
This large difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and is consistent with
Hypotheses 2 and 6 that unsuccessful diversifiers make good hostile takeover targets. It is not
consistent with the fear expressed by plaintiffs in the Time decision that hostile takeovers can
damage valuable strategic business resources.

Another indicator of the value of strategic

resources is a firm's R&D intensity. The mean R&D intensity of hostile takeover targets is
approximately half that of control firms. This difference is the most statistically significant
observed in this study. Similarly, hostile takeover targets are about as half as likely to be major
product innovators (3.8% chance versus a 7.4% chance). The difference in R&D intensity is
lowest among firms with below average Tobin's q, indicating a particularly large difference
among firms with above average Tobin's q. This suggests that high-value, research-intensive
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organizations are only rarely the target of hostile takeovers--a finding which is strongly consistent
with Hypothesis la that firms with rent-providing intangible resources are unlikely targets. This
finding too is inconsistent with the fear expressed by many CEOs that hostile takeovers disrupt
strategically successful businesses.
Somewhat surprisingly, advertising expenses do not differ ·appreciably among targets of
hostile bids and non-targets. Given that advertising is a major means of building marketing
capital, it is apparent that hostile takeovers are not deterred by the presence of all types of
intangible finn assets. This is likely to be caused by the lower levels of damage that a hostile
deal may cause to a firm's brand name capital relative to, say its human capital. It is difficult
to test the proposition that fmns which generate high rents from its human capital are more likely
to be the target of a hostile bid because human capital is not measurable with available data.
One crude proxy is the employee to sales ratio. There is no statistically significant difference
in the employee/sales ratio between hostile targets and controls.
The theory that hostile takeovers expropriate employees receives no support in this study.
Employee intensity, pension expenses and frequency of unionization differ little in the hostile
takeover and control subsamples. Similarly, defensive measures did not appear to have an
appreciable effect on hostile bids. This may be because these measures are ineffective or because
the various effects of these measures on the incidence of hostile activity offset each other. Table
3 also shows that hostile targets are somewhat larger than control fmns. This suggests that
hostile bids are not appreciably deterred by size alone.
The misvaluation explanation for hostile transactions is difficult to test directly since
misvaluation is not directly observable. One trait likely to be associated with misvaluation,
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There appears to be little

statistically significant difference in the levels of analyst forecast disagreement between the
hostile targets and the control firms. This is not consistent with the misvaluation explanation but,
because of the proxy is indirect, it offers relatively weak evidence against it.

Multivariate Analysis
The results for multivariate prediction of hostile takeover targets are reported in Table 4.
Because full data are not available on analyst earnings forecast disagreement two models are
used. The first covers a broader range of firms but excludes analyst disagreement. The second
includes an estimate of the effect of analyst forecast disagreement on the probability of a hostile
takeover and has a smaller sample size.
The dummy variable for below industry profitability is positively related to the likelihood
of a hostile takeover and is statistically significant. As in the univariate analysis, the below
average q x span variable is also an important predictor of hostile takeovers (but only using the
larger sample in Model 1).

The other significant predictor of hostile takeovers was the

R&D/sales ratio.
Variables which were significant in the univariate analysis which are not statistically
significant in the multivariate analysis include span, below average q x R&D/sales, the product
innovator dummy, and the log of assets. The effects of these variables are captured by other
variables in the analysis.

DISCUSSION
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This study has investigated the determinants of hostile takeover activity. The main results show
that firms which have low profitability and both low Tobin's q and high span are likely targets
of hostile takeovers. Given that fmns with low Tobin's q are likely to have create little value
from their resource base, these results show that hostile takeovers target poor diversifiers. This
is consistent with the argument that one of the main roles of hostile transactions is to force
breakup of low synergy conglomerates. This finding paints a different picture than that voiced
by many critics that hostile deals target productive, high synergy organizations. This picture is
supported by the finding that fmns which have high q and high research and development
expenses are particularly unlikely hostile takeover targets. High q, high R&D firms can be
characterized as having successfully developed a base of rent-generating intangible resources.
Such firms appear to be poorly suited for the transitory, financially-oriented business environment
which typically follows a hostile transaction.
Others have argued that hostile takeovers frequently damage important stakeholders such
as employees and suppliers. This study offers no evidence consistent with this argument. Firms
which are labor-intensive, unionized and generous in their pension expenditures are no more
likely than other fmns to be the target of hostile takeovers.

Somewhat surprisingly, fmn's

defensive measures including poison pills and supermajority voting provisions also have no
visible impact on the incidence of hostile takeover activity. Apparently, these barriers are not
able to deter corporate raiders.
A final criticism of hostile takeovers suggests that they target firms which are undervalued
because of capital market inefficiency. While this argument is consistent with the finding of
previous authors that hostile targets have lower market values relative to book than other fmns
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it receives no support in this study. Not only are firms with high amounts of intangible assets
which are likely to be difficult to value less likely to be taken over, but firms which analysts
explicitly have difficulty in evaluating are no more likely to be taken over than other firms.
In conclusion, this study leaves us with a better understanding of the causes of the hostile
takeovers of the 1980s. Overall, the results show that poor diversifiers and firms which have
failed to build rent-generating strategic resources were the most frequent targets of hostile
takeovers. This characterization suggests that the market for corporate control responds largely
to strategic failure by U.S. corporations. In past studies, the market for corporate control has
largely been examined from an agency-theoretic perspective. While this perspective is not
incompatible with the view that hostile deals remedy strategic failure, it overlooks the sources
of managerial failure and appears to overemphasize the importance of high free cash flow as a
source of corporate failure.

21
Table 1. Number of contested and uncontested tender offers

Year

Number of
Uncontested
Offers

Number of
Contested
Offers

1980
1981
1982 .
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

41
47
39
26
61
52
94
114
146
113
53

12
28
29
11
18
32
46
26
62
39
7

Total

786

310

, Source: Mergerstat Review for 1980-1985, W. T. Grimm & Co, 1986. and M&A Magazine,
May/June 1991, p. 14.
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Table 2. Distribution of Sample Finns by Period.

Period

Number of hostile targets

Number of control finns

1981-82
1983-84
1985-86
1987-88

39
34
80
32

687
693
623
554

Total

185

2,557
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Table 3. T-tests for differences in rriean characteristics of hostile takeover targets with control
firms which did not experience a hostile takeover bid in the 1981-88 period. The sample has
2,557 finn years of data for firms which received no hostile bid and 185 firms which received
hostile takeover bids.

Variable

Mean for
hostile bid

Mean for
no hostile bid

t-statistic

Below average income dummy

42.2%

33.8%.

2.31 **

Span

15.6

13.1

1.83*

Below average q x span

10.8

6.7

2.92***

R&D/sales

0.0085

0.0165

5.64***

Below average q x R&D/sales

0.0046

0.0067

2.09**

Advertising to sales

0.013

0.015

0.71

Product innovator dummy

3.8%

7.4%

2.43**

Employees to sales

1.24

1.23

0.11

Pension expense per employee

$73,700

$73,600

0.004

Unionization dummy

25.4%

22.1%

1.06

Defensive measure dummy

30.3%

28.1%

0.64

Log of assets

6.50

6.21

2.21 **

Analyst disagreement•

.225

.188

0.71

a

This variable is available for 105 hostile takeover targets and 1,380 control firm-years.

*** Significant at p < 0.01
** Significant at p < 0.05
* Significant at p < 0.10
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Table 4. Characteristics of hostile takeover targets: Comparison with Value Line firms not
experiencing a hostile takeover bid (dependent variable: probability of receiving a hostile bid).
The sample has 185 hostile targets and 2,557 finn-years for control fmns.

Model 1

Model 2•

Below average income

0.27*
(2.79)

0.49**
(4.89)

Span

-0.0091
(0.81)

-0.0091
(0.53)

Below average q x span

0.021 **
(4.89)

0.012
(1.06)

R&D to sales

-14.5**
(5.44)

-18.1 **
(5.59)

Below average q x R&D/sales

-2.13
(0.06)

3.03
(0.08)

Advertising to sales

-0.32
(0.01)

3.17
(0.77)

Product innovator

-0.11
(0.05)

0.15
(0.08)

Employees to sales

0.042
(0.26)

-0.018
(0.01)

Pension expense to employees

-0.056
(0.42)

0.0052
(0.01)

Unionized fmn

0.0028
(0.01)

0.12
(0.23)

0.054
(0.10)

0.22
(1.01)

Defensive measure
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Table 4 continued

Log of assets

0.11
(2.19)

0.10
(0.17)

Analyst earning forecast
uncertainty

Constant

-3.32***
(45.3)

Log-likelihood
Chi-squared
p

1316.7
37.9
0.0002

a

0.087
(0.64)

-3.24***
(18.5)
733.1
25.5
0.02

This regression is based on data for 105 hostile targets and 1,380 control firm-years.

Chi-squares for coefficients are reported in parentheses
*** Significant at p < 0.01
** Significant at p < 0.05
* Significant at p < 0.10
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